

**TOP SECRET**

15 January 1963

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



State Department review completed

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
25X1

15 January 1963

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS


1. Congo: (Page 1)
2. France: De Gaulle's press conference. (Page 2)
3. Cuba: Fifth SAM site relocated. (Page 3)
4. Togo: Country quiet since Olympio assassination; provisional civilian government may be announced. (Page 5)



25X1

8. Belgium-Burundi: Belgian-Burundi relations seem likely to deteriorate. (Page 10)
9. Notes:  Argentina. (Page 11)

25X1



## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

15 January 1963

### DAILY BRIEF

\*Congo: [Tshombé stated yesterday, in letters addressed to U Thant and to Adoula, that he and his ministers are now ready to "proclaim before the world that the Katanga secession is finished" and to allow UN troops "freedom of movement throughout all the Katanga.]

[The Belgian consul in Salsibury, who went to Kolwezi to maintain contact with Tshombé, was asked by the Katangan leader yesterday to transmit these messages to U Thant and Adoula, with copies to the US, British, French, and Belgian governments.]

[Tshombé reportedly plans to refer to these letters during a press conference this morning.]

[Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak said he believes the position set forth in the Tshombé letters represents a major breakthrough. This may well be, though it is also possible that Tshombé may yet try to draw Adoula and the UN into protracted negotiations once again.]

[In both letters Tshombé expressed readiness to "return to Elisabethville to arrange the modalities for the integral application of the U Thant plan"; he invited Adoula to "meet us at Elisabethville to confirm the national reconciliation," and he asked Adoula "immediately to sign the amnesty envisaged by the U Thant plan."]

[These letters from Tshombé come at a time when the UN forces, according to Bunche, have]

Plans to move in strength on Kolwezi between  
20 and 25 January

The plans for taking Kolwezi include a move  
south from Kamina, another from Jadotville, and a  
paratroop drop on the town itself. UN patrols prob-  
ing the Jadotville-Kolwezi road are reported to have  
reached Guba, about 35 miles from Jadotville.

15 Jan 63

DAILY BRIEF

1-a

\*France: [In his 14 January press conference De Gaulle made his frankest public bid to date for a strong continental European counterweight to US influence in NATO]

[This is apparent in his rejection of the US Polaris missile offer, his open opposition to British membership in the Common Market, and the skepticism he expressed over US commitments to defend Europe with nuclear weapons. His remarks will cast a pall over the EEC negotiations which resumed in Brussels on 14 January, and will precipitate vigorous debate in Bonn]

nationalism is the basis of his refusal to have France take part in a multilateral force, the additional cost of participation may also be a factor]

[De Gaulle emphasized his belief that British accession to the EEC would cost the Continent its ability to exert its full weight in "equilibrium" with the US. His suggestion that economic agreements could be worked out that would safeguard British trade with the EEC may be a hint that association is the relationship he envisages for Britain// ]

15 Jan 63

DAILY BRIEF

2

25X1

\*Cuba: [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED] the SAM site near Chaparra in northern Oriente Province is being dismantled. Presumably the site will be relocated nearby.

The four SAM sites which previously were relocated were moved over relatively short distances and appeared to be operational in about a week's time.

[REDACTED] Cuba may have received one or more midget submarines from the USSR. [REDACTED]

25X1

Soviet midget submarines, useful chiefly for harbor and coastal defense, have very short ranges. They probably could not be employed from Cuba in subversive operations against neighboring countries unless they were towed or carried by larger vessels to a point close to their targets.

\*The economic effects in Cuba of the 14 January break in relations between West Germany and Cuba probably will be minimal. Total trade between the two countries has declined considerably since Castro assumed power, amounting to only about

25X1

15 Jan 63

DAILY BRIEF

3

25X1

\$6 million in the first half of 1962. The break in relations presumably will delay indefinitely any settlement of Cuba's long-standing \$5 million commercial debt to West Germany.

Cuba's Communist newspaper Hoy devoted a front-page editorial on 13 January to a vigorous plea for unity in the Communist world much along the lines of Fidel Castro's remarks on this subject on 2 January. The editorial deprecated the "public polemics over the differences that have arisen among our parties," but it apparently scrupulously avoided blaming either the Soviet or the Chinese party for the split.

15 Jan 63

DAILY BRIEF

4

\*Togo: The country continues quiet since the assassination of President Olympio on Sunday, and announcement of a provisional civilian government may be imminent.

Leaders of the military coup state they are ready to step aside for civilian rule, and reports indicate their first choice to head a new government is former Prime Minister Grunitsky.

Grunitsky, who returned to Lomé yesterday from exile in Dahomey, is conservative in outlook. As premier from 1956 to 1958 in the period prior to Togolese independence, he pursued a policy calling for continued close ties with the French.

Also involved in current maneuverings is Antoine Meatchi, who served in the Grunitsky cabinet and later headed the parliamentary opposition to Olympio. He returned to Lomé yesterday from exile in Ghana.

Neither Grunitsky nor Meatchi is believed to have much popular following outside their home areas in the north. It is uncertain whether either one or the two together could form a stable regime.

Dahomey's moderate President Maga is making a strong effort to influence the evolution of the Togo crisis. The minister he sent to Lomé on Sunday on an "information mission" reportedly has

15 Jan 63

DAILY BRIEF

5

been pushing for a Grunitsky-headed government. It is likely that Ghana is backing Meatchi, who has had contacts with the Nkrumah regime since at least 1958.

There continue to be no indications that Ghana, Dahomey, or France is planning an early movement of troops into Togo. However, Nkrumah reportedly implied to the Dahomean foreign minister on 13 January that Ghana would do so if Dahomey moved first.

15 Jan 63

DAILY BRIEF

6

25X1

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Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800120001-3

Belgium-Burundi: [The Belgian relations with Burundi seem likely to deteriorate if the Burundi Government goes ahead with today's scheduled execution of five men convicted in the assassination of the Burundi prime minister and King's son in October 1961.]

[The men are connected with a pro-Belgian political party now in opposition to the government. They were tried and sentenced to prison by the Belgians in 1961 following independence, but were retried by the Burundis.]

[The US Embassy in Brussels believes that Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak was not bluffing when he informed the Burundi Government on 10 January that if clemency is not shown in this case, Belgium will be unable to continue "friendly relations" with Burundi.]

[The US ambassador in Usumbura believes that if Belgium, now Burundi's only source of external aid, reduces or cuts off aid and brings its technicians home, Burundi may turn to the US or to the Soviet bloc.]

15 Jan 63

DAILY BRIEF

10

NOTES

25X1

Argentina: The brief and violent seizure of the Kaiser automobile plant in Cordoba by 5,000 laid-off workers underscores the rising tension in Argentine labor. Labor-management relations hitherto have been excellent at this plant. Factory shutdowns and retrenchment are increasing unemployment, and even some of the larger industrial firms are failing to meet payrolls on time. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

15 Jan 63

DAILY BRIEF

11

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

The United States Intelligence Board, on  
10 January 1963, approved the following national  
intelligence estimate:

NIE 10-63: Bloc Economic and Military  
Assistance Programs

25X1

15 Jan 63

DAILY BRIEF

12

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

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